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Competitive Analysis with a Sample and the Secretary Problem
Haim Kaplan∗ David Naori† Danny Raz†
Abstract
We extend the standard online worst-case model to accommodate past experience which is
available to the online player in many practical scenarios. We do this by revealing a random
sample of the adversarial input to the online player ahead of time. The online player competes
with the expected optimal value on the part of the input that arrives online. Our model bridges
between existing online stochastic models (e.g., items are drawn i.i.d. from a distribution) and
the online worst-case model. We also extend in a similar manner (by revealing a sample) the
online random-order model.
We study the classical secretary problem in our new models. In the worst-case model we
present a simple online algorithm with optimal competitive-ratio for any sample size. In the
random-order model, we also give a simple online algorithm with an almost tight competitive-
ratio for small sample sizes. Interestingly, we prove that for a large enough sample, no algorithm
can be simultaneously optimal both in the worst-cast and random-order models.
1 Introduction
Online algorithms have proven to be an important tool to study interactive scenarios where the
input is revealed over time and we have to take decisions before seeing all the input. The analysis
in the worst-case adversarial model provides robust guarantees of the expected performance when
the algorithm has no prior knowledge about the input. However, in some cases this model is too
powerful and no algorithm can achieve a non-trivial competitive-ratio (e.g., the secretary problem).
In other cases (cache replacement policies for example) different algorithms provides similar worst-
case guarantee, and thus the model does not help to distinguish between the algorithms [17].
Moreover, in many online scenarios, we have additional information about the online input (data
from the past or other sources) and we want to use it.
To address this point we introduce a simple and natural generalization of the standard worst-case
online model to accommodate past experience. As in this standard model, we allow an adversary
to choose the input sequence as well as the order in which the input is revealed to the online player.
To model the experience that the online player may have, we assume she gets in advance a random
sample of limited size from the adversarial input, which we call the history set. The remaining part
of the input, called the online set, arrives online in adversarial order (that may depends on the
random sample). To evaluate the performance of an online algorithm, we compare the expected
value of its solution to the expected optimal solution one could obtain in hindsight (i.e., the optimal
solution one can get if he knows the online set, and does not have to take decisions online. The
expectation is over the random split into a history and online sets). We traditionally adopt the
term competitive-ratio to refer to the worst ratio between the two. The size of the random sample
presented to the player is a parameter of the model; when limiting this size to be zero, the model is
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identical to the standard worst-case online model. We name this model the adversarial-order model
with a sample (AOS). We also consider the random-order model with a sample (ROS), which is a
similar generalization of the random-order online model, that is, a model in which the elements of
the online set arrives in a uniformly random order. In this model the performance of the online
algorithm is averaged not only on the split into history and online sets but also on the random
order of the online set.
Several models in the literature allow taking prior knowledge into consideration, however, they
relay on overly strong assumptions that might not take place in most realistic conditions. (We
overview notable examples in the related work subsection.) On the other hand, the random sample
assumption we propose is focused solely on modeling the past experience the online player may
have.
We apply our models to the classical online secretary problem which is arguably one of the most
basic online problems. In the secretary problem, a sequence of candidates are presented one-by-one
to an online player. Every candidate is associated with a value (non-negative real number) which
is revealed when the candidate arrives. The online player may choose only one candidate, aiming
to maximize the expected value of the candidate she chooses.
In our AOS model, the adversary picks n+h candidates. Then, h uniformly random candidates
are revealed to the online player upfront for the purpose of learning only. From here on, the
process is identical to the (adversarial-order) secretary problem with the remaining n candidates.
Our results for this problem are illustrated by the two lower curves in Figure 1. We distinguish
between the cases where h < n and h ≥ n: For h < n we describe a simple algorithm (Algorithm 1)
that achieves a competitive-ratio of h/(n+h−1), and prove a matching upper-bound (Theorem 2.3).
In particular, for h = n − 1 the competitive-ratio of Algorithm 1 is 1/2. For h ≥ n, we show that
this competitive-ratio of 1/2 essentially cannot be further improved. We prove an upper-bound of
1
2 ·
2n
2n−1 for this case (Theorem 2.6), and point-out a modification of Algorithm 1 (Algorithm 2)
that achieves a competitive-ratio of 1/2 in this case (h ≥ n).
We then move on to study the secretary problem in the ROS model. Our algorithm in this case
can be viewed as a generalization of the well-known optimal algorithm for the ordinary secretary
problem. The structure of the classical algorithm, sometimes referred to as sample-and-price, is
the same as the structure of most algorithms in the random-order model. It consists of two phases.
In the first phase, known as the sampling phase, the algorithm uses a prefix of the online input
sequence to gather information about the input. This information is then used in the second phase
to guide the decisions on the remaining part of the input. Taking the history set into account, our
algorithm uses a sampling phase only when h is not large enough (specifically, if h ≈ 0.567n or
larger, as illustrated in Figure 1, a sampling phase is not used). More interestingly, it transition
into a new phase when it accumulates a sample of size n. At this point it starts making decisions
based on random subsets of the observed input. Our results for this case are illustrated by the two
upper curves in Figure 1. The competitive-ratio of our algorithm (Algorithm 3) exhibits a trend
similar to the AOS case. It improves as the size of the history set grows until h = n, and from
there on it achieves a competitive-ratio of 1 − (1 − 1/n)n ≥ 1 − 1/e. We prove an upper-bound
which is almost tight when h is small compared to n, however, an interesting gap, especially for
large h, remains unresolved.
Our algorithm for the secretary problem in the ROS model improves upon recent results by
Correa et al. [5] for the prophet inequality in the i.i.d. model in which the online player gets access to
a limited number of training samples from the (unknown) distribution. Intuitively, one can see that
any algorithm for the secretary problem in the ROS model provides at least the same performance
guarantee for the i.i.d. prophet inequality with a sample. Proving this simple observation also
implies a (global) upper bound of approximately 0.745 for the secretary problem in the ROS model
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Figure 1: Overview of our results.
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After we study the secretary problem in each model separately, we explore how well can a
single algorithm perform in both models simultaneously. Clearly, any performance guarantee in
the AOS model also applies to the ROS model. However, we show that high worst-case performance
guarantee might limit the increase in performance in the ROS model over the AOS model. More
concretely, we show that a c-competitive algorithm in the AOS model, is at most (1−c)-competitive
in the ROS model. For h ≥ n, our algorithm for the AOS model (Algorithm 2) is 1/2-competitive
and therefore cannot be more than 1/2-competitive in the ROS model. In Section 4 we describe
an algorithm that is simultaneously 1/e-competitive in the AOS model and (1 − 1/e)-competitive
in the ROS model.
Although in this paper we focus on the secretary problem, we stress that our models and
methods are by no means limited to it. Azar et al. [1] observed that many online algorithms in the
random-order model are in fact order-oblivious, meaning that they use the random-order only to
obtain a random sample from the input. In our models such a sample is given “for free” and we
study how the online player should act when this is the case. In particular, our approach can be
used to adapt existing order-oblivious algorithms to the AOS model and analyze their performance
in this model.
In the ROS model, algorithms for various online problems can be obtained by combining our
approach for the secretary problem with existing algorithms for online problems in the random-
order model. For example, following the approach of Kesselheim et al. [12], our results for the
secretary problem in the ROS model can be extended in a straightforward manner to the weighted
bipartite matching problem, with the same performance guarantees.
Studying the AOS and the ROS models allows to distinguish between the power gained by the
random-order assumption, and the ability to obtain a random sample from the input. Furthermore,
these models allow for simple and direct analysis, as the proofs in this paper suggests.
3
1.1 Further Related Work
Since the secretary problem was solved by Lindley [14] and Dynkin [7], various online problems
have been studied in the random-order model (e.g. [2, 3, 12, 13]), many of which are motivated by
the relation to online mechanism design. Kesselheim et al. [11] studied the secretary problem with
non-uniform arrival order, pointing out that in some cases, weakening the random-order assumption
is essential.
There are several models in the literature where some prior knowledge about the input is
assumed, however, in general these models introduce alongside additional assumptions that in
many cases are not justifiable. One such model is the (known) i.i.d. model in which we assume
the input consists of i.i.d. random variables from a known distribution (see [5, 15] for example). In
most cases however, the knowledge of the exact distribution is unattainable and the model might
not be robust in face of inaccurate estimates.
In the more general settings of the prophet inequality, the assumption that the random variables
are identically distributed is discarded, and each random variable is allowed to be drawn from a
different known distribution (for a recent survey see [6]). The single sample prophet inequality
(see [1] for example) relaxes the assumption that the distributions are known. Instead, the algorithm
gets to sample one input sequence from the corresponding distributions for the purpose of learning.
A main drawback of all these variations of the prophet inequality model is the strong assumption
that the random variables are independent, which might not be realistic.
1.2 Organization of the paper
In Section 2 we study the secretary problem in the AOS model. We begin by establishing formal
definitions and notations, then we prove the lower and upper bounds for the case where h < n, and
subsequently for the case where h ≥ n. In Section 3 we study the secretary problem in the ROS
model. Here too, we start with a formal definition of the problem in the ROS model, and prove
lower and upper bounds. Then, we discuss the relations to the i.i.d. prophet inequality with a
sample. Finally, in Section 4 we prove the inherent limitation of online algorithms when considered
both in the AOS and the ROS models simultaneously, and discuss algorithms that achieve the best
possible performance under this constraint.
2 Adversarial Order
We define the adversarial-order secretary problem with a sample of size h (h-AO-SP) as the fol-
lowing game between an online player and an adversary:
1. An adversary picks a set C = {α1, . . . , αn+h} of n + h candidates. Each candidate αi has a
value v (αi) ∈ R≥0.
1 For simplicity of notation, we use αi to refer both the candidate and its
value.
2. A subset H ⊆ C of cardinality h, which we call the history set, is drawn uniformly at random.
H and n are given to the online player upfront. The online set denoted by O is the set of
remaining candidates, i.e., O = C \H.
3. The adversary picks an ordering of the candidates in O, we let c1, . . . , cn denote the candidates
in the chosen adversarial order.
1Without loss of generality, one can think of the values as distinct. When this is not the case, we assume a
consistent tie-breaker is available so that C is totally ordered. Throughout this paper, when candidates are compared
by their value, we implicitly assume that this tie-breaker is applied.
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4. The candidates c1, . . . , cn are presented one by one to the online player. After every arrival,
the online player has to make an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accept or
reject the current candidate. If she accepts a candidate, the process terminates.
The goal is to maximize the expected value of the accepted candidate compared to the expected
value of the best candidate in O. Let ALG be an algorithm for the online player. For an instance
I = (C, h), let ALG(I) be the random variable that gets the value of the candidate chosen by ALG,
and let OPT(I) be the random variable that gets the maximum value of a candidate in O. We say
that ALG is c-competitive if for every instance I we have E [ALG (I)] ≥ c ·E [OPT(I)], where the
expectation is taken over the random choice of H ⊆ C and the internal randomness of ALG. We
write ALG and OPT instead of ALG(I) and OPT(I) when I is clear from the context.
2.1 Short History
For h ≤ n− 1, we show that Algorithm 1 is optimal with competitive-ratio of h/ (n+ h− 1).
Algorithm 1: h-AO-SP for h ≤ n− 1
T0 ← H;
for candidate cℓ that arrives at round ℓ do
Tℓ ← Tℓ−1 ∪ {cℓ};
if cℓ = max {Tℓ} then
accept cℓ and terminate;
Let α1, . . . , αn+h denote the candidates sorted by their value in decreasing order, i.e., α1 > α2 >
· · · > αn+h. Observe that when α1 is in the online set and α2 is in the history set, the algorithm
accepts α1 no matter what the adversary does. We start by extending this observation in a way
that will allow us to account for the profit of the algorithm in case α2 is also in the online set.
Denote by Hi the event that the top i candidates are in the history set, that is, α1, . . . , αi ∈ H.
Also, denote by Oi the event that the top i candidates are in the online set, namely, α1, . . . , αi ∈ O.
Lemma 2.1. For 1 < i ≤ h ≤ n− 1, E [ALG | Oi] ≥
h
n · E [OPT | Hi−1].
Proof. By downwards induction on i. For i = h, conditioned on Hh−1, the best candidate in O has
value of at most αh. On the other hand, observe that conditioned on Oh and αh+1 ∈ H, by the
definition of the algorithm, it accepts one of α1, . . . , αh, therefore, it gains a profit of at least αh.
We have
E [ALG | Oh] ≥ E [ALG | Oh, αh+1 ∈ H] Pr [αh+1 ∈ H | Oh] =
h
n
αh.
Assume that the lemma holds for i+ 1. We have
E [ALG | Oi] ≥ αi Pr [αi+1 ∈ H | Oi] + E [ALG | Oi+1] Pr [αi+1 ∈ O | Oi]
≥ αi Pr [αi+1 ∈ H | Oi] +
h
n
E [OPT | Hi] Pr [αi+1 ∈ O | Oi]
= αi ·
h
n+ h− i
+ E [OPT | Hi] ·
h
n
·
n− i
n+ h− i
,
(1)
5
where the second inequality in this derivation follows from the induction hypothesis. On the other
hand, we have
E [OPT | Hi−1] = αi Pr [αi ∈ O | Hi−1] + E [OPT | Hi] Pr [αi ∈ H | Hi−1]
= αi ·
n
n+ h− (i− 1)
+ E [OPT | Hi] ·
h− (i− 1)
n+ h− (i− 1)
.
(2)
By subtracting (2) multiplied by h/n from (1), the difference E [ALG | Oi] −
h
nE [OPT | Hi−1] is
lower bounded by
αi
(
h
n+ h− i
−
h
n+ h− i+ 1
)
+
h
n
· E [OPT | Hi]
(
n− i
n+ h− i
−
h− i+ 1
n+ h− i+ 1
)
.
Since h ≤ n− 1, both terms are non-negative and the lemma follows.
Having Lemma 2.1 at hand, we are ready to prove the competitive-ratio of Algorithm 1
Theorem 2.2. For h ≤ n− 1, Algorithm 1 is hn+h−1-competitive.
Proof. Using Lemma 2.1 for i = 2, we get that
E [ALG] ≥ E [ALG | α1 ∈ O,α2 ∈ H] Pr [α1 ∈ O,α2 ∈ H] + E [ALG | α1, α2 ∈ O] Pr [α1, α2 ∈ O]
≥
n
n+ h
·
h
n+ h− 1
α1 +
n
n+ h
·
n− 1
n+ h− 1
·
h
n
E [OPT | α1 ∈ H]
≥
n
n+ h
·
h
n+ h− 1
(
α1 +
h
n
E [OPT | α1 ∈ H]
)
,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that h ≤ n− 1. On the other hand
E [OPT] = E [OPT | α1 ∈ O] Pr [α1 ∈ O] + E [OPT | α1 ∈ H] Pr [α1 ∈ H]
=
n
n+ h
α1 +
h
n+ h
E [OPT | α1 ∈ H]
=
n
n+ h
(
α1 +
h
n
E [OPT | α1 ∈ H]
)
.
We now prove a matching upper bound.
Theorem 2.3. For h ≥ 1, any online algorithm for the h-AO-SP has a competitive-ratio of at
most hn+h−1 .
Proof. Fix n ∈ N and let ε > 0. Let ALG be a c-competitive algorithm for the h-AO-SP. We can
view ALG restricted to inputs of length n+h as a family of functions, P1, . . . , Pn, Pi : R
h+i
≥0 → [0, 1]
where Pi(x1, . . . , xh+i) is the probability that ALG accepts xh+i conditioned on reaching to round
i and receiving H = {x1, . . . , xh} and c1 = xh+1, . . . , ci = xh+i as input. Since ALG receives the
elements of H unordered, we may assume that the first h inputs to Pi are ordered in increasing
order. We call two sequences x1, . . . , xk and y1, . . . , yk order-equivalent if for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k,
xi < xj ⇐⇒ yi < yj. We call the equivalence class of x1, . . . , xk its order-type. We say that ALG
is order-invariant on a set V if for all i ∈ [n], the value of Pi on a sequence of h+ i elements from
V depends only on the order-type of the sequence.
By Moran et al. [16] (Corollary 3.4), there is an infinite set V ⊆ N such that ALG is order-
invariant on V. We construct an instance I = (C, h) where C = {α1, . . . , αn+h} ⊆ V, α2 > α3 >
6
· · · > αn+h and α1 > α2/ε
′ where ε′ = nn+hε. Such instance exists since V ⊆ N is infinite. Now
every choice of an element that is not α1 results in a profit of at most ε
′α1. Let U denote the set
of candidates with value higher than the best candidate in H. Consider an adversary who first
reveals the elements of U in increasing order. Observe that for all i ∈ [n], we have ci = α1 if and
only if α1, . . . , αi ∈ O and αi+1 ∈ H, therefore
Pr[ci = α1] =
h
n+ h
·
n
n+ h− 1
·
n− 1
n+ h− 2
· · ·
n− (i− 1)
n+ h− i
≤
h
n+ h
·
n
n+ h− 1
.(3)
By our assumption that the elements of H are ordered in increasing order, the entire prefix of the
observed sequence until α1 is in increasing order, hence, it is order-equivalent to αi+h, . . . , α1 for
some i ∈ [n]. Since ALG is order-invariant on V, the probability of accepting cj conditioned on
reaching round j and on ci = α1 for some i ≥ j is pj = Pj(αj+h, . . . , α1). Therefore, conditioned
on ci = α1, the probability of reaching round i is
∏i−1
j=1 (1− pj) independently of c1, . . . , ci−1. We
get that for all i ∈ [n]
Pr [ALG accepts α1 | ci = α1] = pi
i−1∏
j=1
(1− pj).(4)
Hence,
Pr [ALG accepts α1] =
n∑
i=1
Pr [ALG accepts α1 | ci = α1] · Pr [ci = α1]
≤
n∑
i=1
pi
i−1∏
j=1
(1− pj) ·
h
n+ h
·
n
n+ h− 1
=
h
n+ h
·
n
n+ h− 1
n∑
i=1
pi
i−1∏
j=1
(1− pj) ≤
h
n+ h
·
n
n+ h− 1
.
The first inequality in this derivation follows from Equations (3) and (4), and the second inequality
is due to the fact that
∑n
i=1 pi
∏i−1
j=1(1 − pj) is a probability of some event, and as such, upper
bounded by 1. We get that
E [ALG] ≤ α1 Pr[ALG accepts α1] + ε
′α1
≤ α1
(
h
n+ h
·
n
n+ h− 1
+ ε′
)
= α1
n
n+ h
(
h
n+ h− 1
+ ε
)
,
while E [OPT] ≥ α1
n
n+h . Overall E [ALG] ≤
(
h
n+h−1 + ε
)
E [OPT]. Since it is true for any ε > 0,
the theorem follows.
2.2 Long History
For the case h ≥ n, we describe an optimal 1/2-competitive algorithm.
Theorem 2.4. Algorithm 2 is 1/2-competitive.
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Algorithm 2: h-AO-SP for h ≥ n
draw a subset T ⊆ H of cardinality n− 1 uniformly at random;
for candidate cℓ that arrives at round ℓ do
if cℓ > max {T} then
accept cℓ and terminate;
Proof. For the analysis, we think of the selection of the set H ⊆ C as being determined by the
following process: first, a subset U ⊆ C of cardinality 2n − 1 is chosen uniformly at random, then
the online set O ⊆ U of cardinality n is chosen uniformly at random, and H = C \O. Since U is a
uniformly random subset of cardinality 2n−1, U and T ∪O are identically distributed. Fix U = Y.
Let β1, . . . , β2n−1 denote the candidates in Y ordered by their value in decreasing order. We have
E [OPT | U = Y] = β1 Pr [β1 ∈ O | U = Y] + E [OPT | β1 /∈ O,U = Y] Pr [β1 /∈ O | U = Y]
= β1
n
2n− 1
+ E [OPT | β1 /∈ O,U = Y]
n− 1
2n− 1
.
(5)
On the other hand
E [ALG | T ∪O = Y] ≥ β1 Pr [β1 ∈ O, β2 ∈ T | T ∪O = Y]
+ E [ALG | β1, β2 ∈ O,T ∪O = Y] Pr [β1, β2 ∈ O | T ∪O = Y]
= β1
n
2n− 1
·
n− 1
2n− 2
+ E [ALG | β1, β2 ∈ O,T ∪O = Y]
n
2n− 1
·
n− 1
2n− 2
.(6)
Following the proof of Lemma 2.1, we have
E [ALG | β1, β2 ∈ O,T ∪O = Y] ≥
n− 1
n
E [OPT | β1 /∈ O,U = Y] .(7)
Substituting (7) in Inequality (6) we get
E [ALG | T ∪O = Y] ≥ β1 ·
n
2n− 1
·
n− 1
2n− 2
+ E [OPT | β1 /∈ O,U = Y] ·
n− 1
2n− 1
·
n− 1
2n− 2
=
1
2
E [OPT | U = Y] ,
(8)
where the last equality follows from (5). By law of total expectation, we get
E [ALG] =
∑
Y⊆C
|Y|=2n−1
E [ALG | T ∪O = Y] Pr [T ∪O = Y]
≥
∑
Y⊆C
|Y|=2n−1
1
2
E [OPT | U = Y] Pr [U = Y]
=
1
2
E [OPT] ,
where the inequality follows from (8) and the fact that Pr [T ∪O = Y] = Pr [U = Y].
Next we prove that asymptotically, no online algorithm can be better than 1/2-competitive. To
this end we use the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.5. For any n, k ∈ N such that n ≥ k, and r ≥ 1 such that rn ∈ N, we have(n
k
)
≤ 1
rk
(rn
k
)
.
For a proof see Appendix A.1.
Theorem 2.6. Any online algorithm for the h-AO-SP has a competitive-ratio of at most 12 ·
2n
2n−1 .
Proof. Let ALG be a c-competitive algorithm. Fix ε > 0. We construct two instances: the first
instance I1 consists of a set E of (h+n)/2 candidates of value ε, and a set Z of (h+n)/2 candidates of
value 0.2 For the second instance I2, we replace one arbitrary candidate of value 0 with a candidate
α of value n+hn . Consider an adversary who first reveals all candidates in E ∩O, then, all candidates
in Z ∩ O. At the end, it reveals α if α ∈ O. Let p be the probability that at least one candidate
from Z is in the online set. We have p = Pr[Z ∩ O 6= ∅] = Pr[E ∩ O 6= ∅]. By Proposition 2.5 for
r = 2, we have p ≥ 1− 1/2n.
Let us first consider I1. We have E [OPT(I1)] = ε · p. Now let A(I) denote the event that
ALG(I) accepts a candidate of value ε. By the assumption that ALG is c-competitive, on I1 it
must accept a candidate of value ε with probability c · p, that is, Pr [A(I1)] ≥ c · p. Therefore
c · p ≤ Pr [A(I1)] ≤ Pr [A(I1) | Z ∩O 6= ∅] · p+ (1− p).(9)
For the second instance, we have E [OPT(I2)] ≥ αPr[α ∈ O] =
n+h
n ·
n
n+h = 1. Since ALG is
c-competitive, we have E [ALG(I2)] ≥ c · E [OPT(I2)] ≥ c. On the other hand, when α ∈ H the
profit is at most ε. We get that
E [ALG (I2)] ≤ αPr[ALG accepts α ∧ α ∈ O] + ε
= αPr[α ∈ O] Pr [ALG accepts α | α ∈ O] + ε
= Pr [ALG accepts α | α ∈ O] + ε.
Therefore, conditioned on α ∈ O, the probability that ALG accepts α is at least c− ε. Since all the
candidates in E arrive first and α arrives last, by Inequality (9) and the lower bound on p we have
Pr [A(I2) | α ∈ O] = Pr [A(I1) | Z ∩O 6= ∅] ≥
c · p− (1− p)
p
≥ c−
2n
2n − 1
+ 1.
Conditioned on α ∈ O, the probability that ALG accepts α is at most 1 − Pr [A(I2) | α ∈ O]. We
get that
c− ε ≤ 1− Pr [A(I2) | α ∈ O] ≤
2n
2n − 1
− c.
Hence, c ≤ 12 ·
2n
2n−1 +
ε
2 .
3 Random Order
We define the random-order secretary problem with a sample of size h (h-RO-SP) similarly to
the game defined for the adversarial order case, the only difference is that the order in which the
candidates in O are presented to the online player is chosen uniformly at random. More explicitly,
we define it as the following game:
2We assume, without loss of generality, that h+ n is even.
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1. An adversary picks a set C = {α1, . . . , αn+h} of n + h candidates. Each candidate αi has a
value v (αi) ∈ R≥0.
3
2. A subset H ⊆ C of cardinality h is drawn uniformly at random.
3. The candidates in O are presented to the online player one by one in a uniformly random
order. After every arrival, the online player has to make an immediate and irrevocable decision
whether to accept or reject the current candidate. If she accepts a candidate, the process
terminates.
Let ALG be an algorithm for the online player. In this section, E [ALG] is taken over the random
choice of H ⊆ C, the random arrival order of candidates in O and the internal randomness of ALG.
We consider a natural algorithm for this problem. It operates in three phases which we call the
sampling phase, Phase 1 and Phase 2. The sampling phase and Phase 1, are similar to the optimal
algorithm for the ordinary secretary problem. The parameter q is the fraction of rounds used for
the sampling phase. It is determined as a function of n and h which emerges from the analysis.4
In Phase 1 the algorithm accepts a candidate if he is the best so far (including the history set). In
Phase 2, at every round the algorithm selects n− 1 random candidates from the past, and accepts
the current candidate if he is the best among them.
Algorithm 3: h-RO-SP
T0 ← H;
q ← max
{
e−e
−h/n
− hn , 0
}
;
for candidate cℓ that arrives at round ℓ do
Tℓ ← Tℓ−1 ∪ {cℓ};
if ℓ ≤ qn then /* sampling phase */
continue to the next round;
1 else if |Tℓ| ≤ n then /* phase 1 */
if cℓ = max {T} then
accept cℓ and terminate;
2 else /* phase 2 */
draw a subset Xℓ ⊆ Tℓ−1 of cardinality (n − 1) uniformly at random;
if cℓ > max {Xℓ} then
accept cℓ and terminate;
We now analyze the performance of Algorithm 3. Unless specifically indicated otherwise we
assume that h ≤ n − 1. Our reasoning still applies for h ≥ n, but since Phase 1 is skipped
completely in this case, it requires a different base-case which we discuss afterwards. We bound
the expected profit of the algorithm at each round separately. To this end, for a fixed round ℓ, we
think of the random process that leads to round ℓ as if it is determined by the following steps:
(1) First, a set of candidates Sℓ ⊆ C of cardinality h+ ℓ is chosen uniformly at random.
(2) Second, the candidate to arrive at round ℓ, cℓ, is chosen uniformly at random from Sℓ. Let
Sℓ−1 ← Sℓ \ {cℓ}.
3The assumptions we made regarding the values of the candidates in Section 2 also apply in this case.
4We assume qn is an integer.
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(3) Finally, Step (2) is repeated with Sℓ−1 to determine the candidates that arrive at rounds
ℓ− 1, . . . , 1. H is the set of the remaining candidates, i.e., S0.
We now bound the expected profit of the algorithm at each round separately. Let Rℓ denote the
profit of the algorithm at round ℓ. In Lemma 3.1 we derive the probability that ALG rejects the
first ℓ candidates for a round ℓ in Phase 1. Then, we use this result to bound E [Rℓ] in Lemma 3.3.
Analogous results for Phase 2 are presented in Lemma 3.4 and Lemma 3.5.
For qn+ 1 ≤ k ≤ n, we denote by Mk the event that ck is accepted by the algorithm.
Lemma 3.1. For qn+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− h, for any Uℓ ⊆ C such that |Uℓ| = h+ ℓ, we have
Pr

 ℓ∧
k=qn+1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ

 = h+ qn
h+ ℓ
.
Proof. Recall that Tqn (defined in the description of Algorithm 1) is the set of h + qn candidates
that the algorithm observes before Phase 1 begins. Conditioned on Sℓ = Uℓ, by the definition of
Phase 1, if max {Uℓ} appears in Tqn, the algorithm rejects all candidates until round ℓ. Conversely,
if max {Uℓ} /∈ Tqn, the algorithm must accept it, or some other candidate before it encounters
max {Uℓ}. We get
Pr

 ℓ∧
k=qn+1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ

 = Pr [max {Uℓ} ∈ Tqn | Sℓ = Uℓ] = h+ qn
h+ ℓ
.
For the proof of Lemma 3.3 below, we also use the following proposition
Proposition 3.2. Suppose X ⊆ R is a finite set. Let A ⊆ X and B ⊆ X be uniformly random
subsets of cardinality k and n respectively, where k ≤ n. Then, E [max {A}] ≥ knE [max {B}].
For a proof see Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3.3. For qn+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n− h, we have
E [Rℓ] =
h+ qn
h+ ℓ− 1
·
1
n
E [OPT] .
Proof. By Step (1), Sℓ ⊆ C is a uniformly random subset of size h+ ℓ ≤ n, therefore, by Proposi-
tion 3.2, E [max {Sℓ}] ≥
h+ℓ
n E [OPT]. We now bound E [Rℓ | Sℓ = Uℓ]. We have
E [Rℓ | Sℓ = Uℓ] = max {Uℓ}Pr

Mℓ ℓ−1∧
k=qn+1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ


= max {Uℓ}Pr

 ℓ−1∧
k=qn+1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ−1 = Uℓ \ {max {Uℓ}}

 1
h+ ℓ
= max {Uℓ}
h+ qn
h+ ℓ− 1
·
1
h+ ℓ
,
where the first equality is due to the fact that cℓ is accepted if and only if cℓ = max {Uℓ}, the
second equality follows from the fact that Pr [cℓ = max {Uℓ} | Sℓ = Uℓ] =
1
h+ℓ due to Step (2), and
the third equality follows from Lemma 3.1. By law of total expectation, we get
E [Rℓ] = E [E [Rℓ | Sℓ]] = E
[
max {Sℓ}
h+ qn
h+ ℓ− 1
·
1
h+ ℓ
]
=
h+ qn
h+ ℓ− 1
·
1
n
E [OPT] .
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We now move to bound the expected profit of the algorithm at Phase 2.
Lemma 3.4. For n− h ≤ ℓ ≤ n, for any Uℓ ⊆ C such that |Uℓ| = h+ ℓ, we have
Pr

 ℓ∧
k=qn+1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ

 = h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−(n−h)
Proof. For ℓ = n − h, by Lemma 3.1, the claim holds. Now assume by induction that the claim
holds for ℓ− 1. Fix Uℓ ⊆ C. Let Fm be the family of subsets of Uℓ of cardinality m. For α ∈ Uℓ let
Fαm ⊆ Fm be the family of subsets in which the maximum value is greater than α. Recall that Xℓ is
the subset drawn by ALG at round ℓ. For the purpose of the analysis, we assume that ALG draws
all of X1, . . . ,Xn, regardless of the round in which it picks the secretary. Observe that conditioned
on Sℓ = Uℓ and cℓ = α, ALG rejects cℓ if and only if Xℓ ∈ F
α
n−1. By this observation along with
the law of total probability, we have
Pr

 ℓ∧
k=qn+1
¬Mℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ

 = ∑
α∈Uℓ
∑
X∈Fαn−1
Pr

 ℓ−1∧
k=qn+1
¬Mℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ, cℓ = α,Xℓ = X


· Pr [cℓ = α,Xℓ = X | Sℓ = Uℓ] .
(10)
In addition, conditioned on Sℓ−1 = Uℓ\{cℓ} the event
∧ℓ−1
k=qn+1 ¬Mℓ is independent ofXℓ. Therefore,
we get
Pr

 ℓ−1∧
k=qn+1
¬Mℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ, cℓ = α,Xℓ = X

 = Pr

 ℓ−1∧
k=qn+1
¬Mℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ−1 = Uℓ \ {α}


=
h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−1−(n−h)
,
(11)
where the second equality follows from the induction hypothesis. Now by Step (2) and since Xℓ is
a uniformly random subset of Uℓ \ {cℓ}, for every α ∈ Uℓ and X ∈ F
α
n−1 we have
Pr [cℓ = α,Xℓ = X | Sℓ = Uℓ] = Pr [cℓ = α | Sℓ = Uℓ] · Pr [Xℓ = X | cℓ = α, Sℓ = Uℓ]
=
1
h+ ℓ
·
1(h+ℓ−1
n−1
) .(12)
Substituting (11) and (12) in Equation (10), we get
Pr

 ℓ∧
k=qn+1
¬Mℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ

 = ∑
α∈Uℓ
∑
X∈Fαn−1
h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−1−(n−h)
·
1
ℓ+ h
·
1(h+ℓ−1
n−1
)
=
h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−1−(n−h)
·
1
ℓ+ h
·
1(h+ℓ−1
n−1
) ∑
α∈Uℓ
∑
X∈Fαn−1
1.
For a subset X ⊆ Uℓ let X
− = X \ max {X}. By exchange of order of summation, we have∑
α∈Uℓ
∑
X∈Fαn−1
1 =
∑
X∈Fn
∑
α∈X− 1 =
(h+ℓ
n
)
(n− 1). Overall, we get
Pr

 ℓ∧
k=qn+1
¬Mℓ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ

 = h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−1−(n−h)
·
n− 1
ℓ+ h
·
(h+ℓ
n
)
(h+ℓ−1
n−1
)
=
h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−(n−h)
.
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Lemma 3.5. For ℓ ≥ n− h+ 1, we have
E [Rℓ] =
h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−(n−h+1)
·
1
n
E [OPT] .
Proof. By Step (1), Sℓ ⊆ C is a uniformly random subset of cardinality h + ℓ, by Step (2), cℓ is
uniformly random element of Sℓ and by the definition of the algorithm, Xℓ ⊆ Sℓ \ {cℓ} is uniformly
random subset of cardinality n− 1. Therefore, Xℓ ∪ {cℓ} ⊆ C is a uniformly random subset of size
n. Hence, E [max {Xℓ ∪ {cℓ}}] = E [OPT]. Also, the probability that cℓ has the maximum value
in Xℓ ∪ {cℓ} is 1/n. We now bound E [Rℓ | Sℓ = Uℓ,Xℓ ∪ {cℓ} = Vℓ] for any Uℓ ⊆ C and Vℓ ⊆ Uℓ of
appropriate cardinalities. We have
E [Rℓ | Sℓ = Uℓ,Xℓ ∪ {cℓ} = Vℓ] = max {Vℓ}Pr

Mℓ ℓ−1∧
k=qn+1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ,Xℓ ∪ {cℓ} = Vℓ


= max {Vℓ}
1
n
Pr

 ℓ−1∧
k=qn+1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ−1 = Uℓ \max {Vℓ}


= max {Vℓ}
1
n
·
h+ qn
n
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−(n−h+1)
,
where the first equality in this derivation is due to the fact that cℓ is accepted if and only if
cℓ = max {Vℓ}, and the last equality follows from Lemma 3.4. We can now conclude
E [Rℓ] = E [E [Rℓ | Sℓ,Xℓ ∪ {cℓ}]]
= E
[
max {Xℓ ∪ {cℓ}}
1
n
·
h+ qn
n
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−(n−h+1)]
=
h+ qn
n
·
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−(n−h+1)
·
1
n
E [OPT] .
Theorem 3.6. Algorithm 3 is c(h, n)-competitive, where
c(h, n) =
{
e−e
−h/n
0 ≤ h ≤ rn
h
n
(
1− ln
(
h
n
)
− e−h/n
)
rn < h ≤ n− 1,
and r ≈ 0.567 is the solution of e−e
−x
− x = 0.
Note that for h = 0, we are in the settings of the ordinary secretary problem. By Theorem 3.6,
the competitive-ratio of Algorithm 3 in this case is c(0, n) = 1/e. This is not surprising since in
this case we set q(0, n) = 1/e and our algorithm is identical to the classical optimal algorithm for
the secretary problem.
Proof of Theorem 3.6. We use Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.5 to sum over the expected profit of the
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algorithm in each phase. For Phase 1, we get by Lemma 3.3 that
n−h∑
ℓ=qn+1
E [Rℓ] =
1
n
E [OPT]
n−h∑
ℓ=qn+1
h+ qn
h+ ℓ− 1
= E [OPT]
h+ qn
n
n−1∑
k=qn+h
1
k
≥ E [OPT]
h+ qn
n
ln
(
n
qn+ h
)
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that
∑n−1
k=qn+h
1
k ≥
∫ n
qn+h
1
xdx = ln
(
n
qn+h
)
. For Phase 2,
we get by Lemma 3.5 that
n∑
ℓ=n−h+1
E [Rℓ] = E [OPT]
1
n
·
h+ qn
n
n∑
ℓ=n−h+1
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−(n−h+1)
= E [OPT]
1
n
·
h+ qn
n
h−1∑
k=0
(
1−
1
n
)k
= E [OPT]
h+ qn
n
(
1−
(
1−
1
n
)h)
≥ E [OPT]
h+ qn
n
(
1− e−
h
n
)
.
where the inequality follows from the fact that 1 + x ≤ ex for all x ∈ R. Overall,
E [ALG] =
n−h∑
ℓ=qn+1
E [Rℓ] +
n∑
ℓ=n−h+1
E [Rℓ] ≥ E [OPT]
h+ qn
n
(
ln
(
n
qn+ h
)
+
(
1− e−
h
n
))
.
This bound is maximized at q(h, n) = max
{
e−e
−h/n
− hn , 0
}
for which we get E [ALG] ≥ c(h, n) ·
E [OPT].
Note that for fixed n ∈ N, q(h, n) = max
{
e−e
−h/n
− hn , 0
}
is a monotone non-increasing function
of h, meaning that the sampling phase is getting shorter as the history size grows, and for h > rn,
the sampling phase is skipped completely.
Theorem 3.7. For h ≥ n, Algorithm 3 is
(
1−
(
1− 1n
)n)
-competitive.
The proof is similar to the case where h ≤ n − 1. In this case the algorithm starts operating
directly from Phase 2, thus, a small modification to the proof is need. For completeness, we provide
a proof in Appendix A.3.
We next prove an upper bound on the competitive-ratio for the problem. A similar asymptotic
result was established in [5], we provide here a proof that applies for any n ∈ N.
Theorem 3.8. Any online algorithm for the h-RO-SP has a competitive-ratio of at most{
1
e ·
n+h
n +
1
n
h
n+h ≤
1
e
h
n ln
(
h+n
h
)
+ 1n otherwise.
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Proof. Fix n, h ∈ N. We consider a classical settings of the secretary problem in which the input
to the online player at each online round is only the rank of the arriving candidate among the sub-
sequence of already observed candidates, and the goal is to maximize the probability of accepting
the best candidate overall. For ease of presentation, we denote this problem by SP. Gilbert and
Mosteller [8] showed that the structure of an optimum strategy for the SP is to reject the first
q-fraction of candidates, for some q ∈ [0, 1], then accepting any candidate who is the best so far.
Using this strategy, the probability of accepting the best candidate on input of size n+ h is
q
n+h−1∑
ℓ=q(n+h)
1
ℓ
= q
n+h−1∑
ℓ=q(n+h)+1
1
ℓ
+
1
n+ h
≤ q
n+h∫
q(n+h)
1
x
dx+
1
n+ h
= q ln
(
1
q
)
+
1
n+ h
.
Subject to an additional constraint that the first h candidates must be rejected, i.e., q ≥ hn+h ,
this bound on the probability is maximized for q = max {1/e, h/(n + h)}. Therefore, if the first h
candidates must be rejected, the probability of accepting the best candidate is at most
p =
{
1
e +
1
n+h
h
n+h ≤
1
e
h
n+h ln
(
h+n
h
)
+ 1n+h otherwise.
Let 0 < ε ≪ 1 and let ALG be a c-competitive online algorithm for the h-RO-SP. Following
the discussion in the proof of Theorem 2.3, there exists an infinite V ⊆ N, such that ALG is
order-invariant on V, and we think of ALG as a family of functions P1, . . . , Pn. We construct an
instance for the h-RO-SP, I = (C, h) such that C = {α1, . . . , αn+h} ⊆ V, α2 > α3 > · · · > αn+h
and α1 > α2/ε
′ where ε′ = nn+hε. Let p1 be the probability that ALG accepts α1. We get
E [ALG] ≤ p1α1 + ε
′α1, whereas E [OPT] ≥ α1
n
n+h , therefore
c ≤
E [ALG(I)]
E [OPT(I)]
≤
α1 (p1 + ε
′)
α1
n
n+h
=
n+ h
n
(
p1 + ε
′
)
.
Using ALG, we construct an algorithm ALG′ for the SP subject to the constraint that the first h
candidates must be rejected. ALG′ rejects the first h candidates, then, at round h+j for all j ∈ [n],
it constructs a sequence x1, . . . , xh+j from the elements of C which is order-equivalent to the input
sequence of relative ranks until that point in time. Then, it accepts the current candidate with
probability Pj(x1, . . . , xh+j). Observe that the probability of ALG
′ to accept the best candidate is
exactly p1, thus, p1 ≤ p. Overall we get
c ≤
n+ h
n
(
p1 + ε
′
)
≤
n+ h
n
(
p+ ε′
)
=
{
1
e ·
n+h
n +
1
n
h
n+h ≤
1
e
h
n ln
(
h+n
h
)
+ 1n otherwise
+ ε.
We note that Theorem 3.8 can also be derived from the work of Buchbinder et al. [4], by
including the constraint that the first h candidates must be rejected in the linear program that
characterizes all algorithms for the secretary problem.
3.1 The Relation to the I.I.D. Prophet Inequality with a Sample
We denote the prophet inequality for i.i.d. random variables from an unknown distribution, with h
training samples by h-IID-PI. We prove the following simple observation in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 3.9. Let ALG be a c-competitive algorithm for the h-RO-SP, then ALG is a c-competitive
algorithm for the h-IID-PI.
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Figure 2: Improvement for the h-IID-PI
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A direct implication of Theorem 3.9 is that the upper bound of 1/β ≈ 0.745 by Hill and
Kertz [9, 10] on the prophet inequality for i.i.d. random variables from a known distribution applies
to the h-RO-SP for any h.5
Corollary 3.10. Any online algorithm for the h-RO-SP has a competitive-ratio of at most 1/β ≈
0.745.
Another consequence of Theorem 3.9 is that Algorithm 3 improves upon the results of Correa
et al. [5] for the h-IID-PI when h < n− 1. The improvement is illustrated in Figure 2.
4 Have it Both Ways
Clearly, any performance guarantee in the AOS model applies also to the ROS model. A natural
question in this context is: can we have a single algorithm that performs well in both models? A
very desired property of an algorithm would be a good worst-case performance guarantee, and a
better one in case the input arrives in a random order. Next we formalize and prove the following
intuitive result: optimizing the algorithm for the worst-case might inherently reduce performance
in the random-order case, and vice versa.
Theorem 4.1. Let ALG be a c-competitive algorithm for the h-AO-SP, and let ε > 0. Then there
exists n0 ∈ N such that for any n ≥ n0, the competitive-ratio of ALG for the h-RO-SP on instances
of length n+ h is at most (1− c+ ε).
Proof. Fix ε > 0. In a similar way to the proof of Theorem 2.6, we construct two instances: the
first instance I1 consists of a set E of m candidates of value ε
′ = ε/2 , and a set Z of n + h −m
candidates of value 0. For the second instance I2, we replace one arbitrary candidate of value 0
with a candidate α of value n+hn .
Consider an adversary in the AOS model which first reveals all candidates in the online set except
α in an arbitrary order. At the end, it reveals α if α ∈ O. Now, since ALG is c-competitive in the
5β is the unique value solving
∫ 1
0
1
y(1−ln(y))+(β−1)
dy = 1.
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AOS model, as in the proof of Theorem 2.6, conditioned on α ∈ O, the probability that ALG accepts
α is at least c − ε′. Since α arrives last, it follows that Pr [ALG(I2) reaches cn | α ∈ O] ≥ c − ε
′,
and since it replaces a uniformly random element of Z from I1, until arriving to the last candidate,
it is impossible to distinguish between facing I2 conditioned on α ∈ O, and facing I1 conditioned
on cn ∈ Z. Therefore,
Pr [ALG(I1) reaches cn | cn ∈ Z] ≥ c− ε
′.(13)
Note that the above probabilities are taken over the random choice of O ⊆ C, and the internal
randomness of ALG.
We now move to analyze the expected profit of the algorithm in the ROS model. We have
E [ALG(I1)] = E [ALG(I1) | cn ∈ Z] Pr [cn ∈ Z] + E [ALG(I1) | cn /∈ Z] Pr [cn /∈ Z] .(14)
Conditioned on cn ∈ Z, when the algorithm reaches cn, its profit is 0. Otherwise, its profit is at
most ε′. Therefore, we get that
E [ALG(I1) | cn ∈ Z] ≤ ε
′ (1− Pr [ALG(I1) reaches cn | cn ∈ Z]) ≤ ε
′
(
1−
(
c− ε′
))
,(15)
where the last inequality follows from (13), since it applies for any order of the elements in O, it
also applies when they randomly ordered. In addition, we clearly have E [ALG(I1) | cn /∈ Z] ≤ ε
′.
Using this and Inequality (15) in (14) we get that
E [ALG(I1)] ≤ ε
′
(
1−
(
c− ε′
))
Pr[cn ∈ Z] + ε
′ Pr[cn /∈ Z]
= ε′
(
1−
n+ h−m
n+ h
(c− ε′)
)
.
On the other hand, E [OPT(I1)] = ε
′ Pr[E ∩O 6= ∅]. We have
E [ALG(I1)]
E [OPT(I1)]
≤
1−
(
1− mn+h
)
(c− ε′)
Pr[E ∩O 6= ∅]
.
Using Proposition 2.5 with r = n+hn+h−m , we can bound Pr[E ∩ O = ∅] ≤
(
1− mn+h
)n
≤ e−
n·m
n+h . By
choosing m = n+hn ln(n), we get that
E [ALG(I1)]
E [OPT(I1)]
≤
n
n− 1
(
1−
(
1−
ln(n)
n
)
(c− ε′)
)
−−−→
n→∞
1− (c− ε′).
Therefore, there exists n0 ∈ N such that for any n ≥ n0, we have E [ALG(I1)]/E [OPT(I1)] ≤
1− (c− ε′) + ε′ = 1− c+ ε.
Note that a weaker (asymptotic) version of Theorem 2.6 follows from Theorem 4.1 as follows.
Assume by contradiction that ALG is (1/2 + ε)-competitive in the AOS model and therefore also
in the ROS model. Then by Theorem 4.1, ALG is at most 1/2-competitive in the ROS model and
we get a contradiction. It also follows that Algorithm 2 is an optimal 1/2-competitive algorithm
when considering both models. A natural question that arises here is, are there other values of c
for which we can obtain a c-competitive algorithm in the AOS model which is (1− c)-competitive
in the ROS model? We answer this question in the affirmative for c = 1/e and h ≥ n(n− 1).
Theorem 4.2. For h ≥ n(n− 1), there exists a 1/e-competitive algorithm for the h-AO-SP which
is also (1− 1/e)-competitive for the h-RO-SP.
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Proof. Consider an algorithm that draws a uniformly random subset of cardinality n(n − 1) from
the history set, and partitions it into n uniformly random subsets S1, . . . , Sn of cardinality n − 1
each. Then, at each online round ℓ ∈ [n], the algorithm accepts the current candidate cℓ if and
only if cℓ > max {Sℓ}.
Let x1, . . . , xn be the elements of O in a uniformly random order. If we randomly pick a subset
X ⊆ H of cardinality n(n− 1), and randomly partition it into n subsets X1, . . . ,Xn of cardinality
n− 1 each, then, T = ((X1, x1), . . . , (Xn, xn)) is a tuple of pairs consisting of n
2 distinct elements
from C. Each such tuple has the same probability to be chosen. Therefore, Xi ∪ {xi} ⊆ C is a
uniformly random subset of cardinality n, and xi > max{Xi} with probability 1/n independently for
each i ∈ [n]. Let P ⊆ O be the set of candidates that satisfy xi > max {Xi}. If the candidates of O
arrive in random order, the algorithm that we suggest processes the elements of T in a random order,
and therefore, it accepts a random element of P . When it accepts a candidate, it is the maximum
of a uniformly random subset of cardinality n from C, thus, its profit in this case is E [OPT].
The probability that the algorithm accepts a candidate (i.e., P 6= ∅) is 1 − (1− 1/n)n ≥ 1 − 1/e.
Therefore, in the ROS model, the profit of the algorithm is at least (1− 1/e) E [OPT].
When the elements of O arrive in adversarial order, the adversary can force the algorithm to
pick the worst element in P . Observe that in case |P | = 1, the arrival order is irrelevant and
the algorithm must accept the only candidate in P . We get that the profit of the algorithm in the
adversarial-order case, is at least the profit of the algorithm in the random-order case when |P | = 1.
We therefore return to the random-order case and lower bound the profit of the algorithm in the
AOS model by using the above observation. Following the discussion in the previous paragraph,
the probability that xi > max{Xi} for exactly one i ∈ [n] (i.e., |P | = 1) is
(n
1
)
1
n
(
1− 1n
)n−1
which
for n > 1 is at least 1/e (the case n = 1 is trivial). In this case the profit of the algorithm is
E [OPT]. Overall, the expected profit of the algorithm in the AOS model is at least 1eE [OPT].
We note that Algorithm 3 does not achieve any bounded competitive-ratio in the AOS model
when a sampling phase is used (i.e., for h < 0.567n), since the adversary can ensure the algorithm
does not accept the best candidate by placing him in the sampling phase, and any other choice
might yield a negligible profit.
5 Discussion
In this paper we introduce new models for the design and analysis of online algorithms, where prior
knowledge can be accounted for while preserving most of the power of the adversary. This is done
by making the adversary expose a random sample of a larger worst case input in advance to the
online player. The adversary then uses the remaining part of the input at the online stage. In this
way, we model “similar” data that the online player can learn from in advance.
We note that our models also cover other natural settings. A particularly interesting example
is the following: assume a finite population of m elements is chosen by an adversary, such that
any sample of n elements from the population defines an input instance. An online player gets to
sample h elements from the population (without replacement) for learning. Then, the adversary
gets to sample n elements and challenges the player in an online fashion with these n samples (in
adversarial order or random order).
Many interesting questions are open for future research. For the secretary problem in the
ROS model, a gap between the lower and upper bounds remains unresolved. There is also room
for designing online algorithms with the objective of optimizing the performance in both models
simultaneously.
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As mentioned in the introduction the models we describe here are general and can be applied
to various online problems. A particularly interesting example is the weighted bipartite matching
problem. Following the approach of [12], Algorithm 3 can be easily extended to the weighted
bipartite matching problem in the ROS model, without any loss in the competitive-ratio. An
interesting question is, can the same be done in the AOS model?
A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.5
(
n
k
)
=
n · (n− 1) · · · (n− (k − 1))
k!
=
1
rk
·
r · n · r · (n− 1) · · · r · (n− (k − 1))
k!
≤
1
rk
·
(rn) · (rn− 1) · · · (rn− (k − 1))
k!
=
1
rk
(
rn
k
)
.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let C ⊆ B be a uniformly random subset of cardinality k. Since B is a uniformly random subset
of X of cardinality n, C is also a uniformly random subset of X of cardinality k. Therefore
E [max {A}] = E [max {C}]. By law of total expectation, we have
E [max {C}] = E [E [max {C} | B]] ≥ E [max {B}Pr [max {B} ∈ C | B]]
= E
[
k
n
max {B}
]
=
k
n
E [max {B}] .
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Following the inductive argument in the proof of Lemma 3.4 and replacing the base case to reflect
the fact that the algorithm starts directly from Phase 2, it is easy to verify that for every round
ℓ ∈ [n] and for any Uℓ ⊆ C such that |Uℓ| = h+ ℓ, we have
Pr
[
ℓ∧
k=1
¬Mk
∣∣∣∣∣ Sℓ = Uℓ
]
=
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ
.
Following the proof of Lemma 3.5 and replacing the use of Lemma 3.4 by the above result, we get
that for every ℓ ∈ [n]
E [Rℓ] =
(
1−
1
n
)ℓ−1
·
1
n
E [OPT] .
Now we can sum over profit of the algorithm at each round and get the theorem.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.9
Let T1, . . . , Th,X1, . . . ,Xn be i.i.d. random variables drawn from a distribution F where T1, . . . , Th
denote are the training samples, and Xi is the sample that arrives at round i, for i ∈ [n]. We
may assume that the realizations of T1, . . . , Th,X1, . . . ,Xn are obtained by first independently
drawing n + h values from F to obtain a sequence of values C = (Y1, . . . , Yn+h), then permuting
them uniformly at random to obtain the value of each random variable. Fix C = (y1, . . . , yh+n).
Conditioned on C = C, the problem is identical to the h-RO-SP, since T1, . . . , Th are h uniformly
random elements of C, and the remaining elements arrive in a uniformly random order. Therefore,
we get
E [ALG ({T1, . . . , Th,X1, . . . ,Xn} , h) | C = C] ≥ c · E [max {X1, . . . ,Xn} | C = C] ,
where the expectation is taken over the random permutation of the elements in C. The lemma
follows by taking the expectation over C, or explicitly
E [ALG({T1, . . . , Th,X1, . . . ,Xn} , h)] = E [E [ALG({T1, . . . , Th,X1, . . . ,Xn} , h) | C]]
≥ E [c · E [max {X1, . . . ,Xn} | C]]
= c · E [max {X1, . . . ,Xn}] .
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